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cyber security tools – assessment and standards documentation and/or software that      
enables organizations to assess, plan, and execute cybersecurity 
improvements based on their business requirements, risk tolerances, and 
resources. 
non-materiel – “non-stuff” factors such as procedures, training, leadership, regulations, 
personnel, and laws that can affect an effort. 
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This thesis study introduces operational concepts for accelerating necessary cyber 
security improvements for critical infrastructure industrial control systems.  National 
critical infrastructures’ industrial control systems experienced a 20% annual increase in 
cyber incidents during fiscal year 2015 (DHS ICS-CERT, 2015).  Industrial control 
systems are used in several critical infrastructure sectors to include energy, 
transportation, manufacturing, and water utilities.  Critical infrastructures support public 
health and life safety, economic vitality, national defense, and overarching societal well-
being.  Significant damage or disruptions to a critical infrastructure could result in 
potentially catastrophic and cascading consequences.  For example, a disruptive cyber-
attack on a water utility would have life safety and health consequences when fire 
hydrants fail during a fire, and hospitals’ operations are impaired. 
The operational concepts introduced in this study refers to the assessment and 
integration of procedures, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, 
facilities, and regulations to plan and execute with the specific goal of accelerating 
cybersecurity improvements.  This study will focus on cybersecurity for Indiana water 




lessons learned from the State of Indiana’s 2016 cyber exercise.  The Indiana Department 
of Homeland Security led this functional cyber exercise with public and private partners 
during May 18 and 19, 2016, using the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center’s water 
treatment plant and distribution system.  
Outcomes of this study were the identification of Indiana water utilities’ 
cybersecurity capability gaps and recommendations to improve prevention, and resilience 
to cyber-attacks from an operational perspective.  This thesis recommends continuing 
emphasis of operational concepts to accelerate reversing the rising trends of critical 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview to this research study and to this document. 
This chapter establishes significance within the already existing canvas of critical 
infrastructure cyber security that is as broad as it is deep. Important also is laying the 
practical groundwork related to the definition of scope through purpose, research 
questions, assumptions, and limitations. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief 
overview of this project. 
1.2 Background 
While conducting military knowledge management enterprise operations I 
became concerned about how do you ensure you have the “right size” cybersecurity 
solution (i.e. effective without over spending) for your strategy and operations to protect 
your enterprise’s integrity, availability, and confidentiality.  Regardless of the 
environment (military, financial, medical, manufacturing, etc.) the absence of an effective 
enterprise cybersecurity solution, makes it difficult if not impossible to maintain and 
increase organizational speed and certainty for effective decision making and execution.   
The diversity in system enterprises required by various environments (finance, 
medical, governmental, etc.) can require significantly different cyber security solutions 




cybersecurity for Indiana water utilities based on publicly available lessons learned from 
Indiana Department of Homeland Security’s (IDHS) 2016 cyber exercise.   
In recent years much research has been devoted to assessing and standards for 
cybersecurity of industrial control systems.  Yet the continuing annual increases in 
number of critical infrastructure cyber incidents raises questions.  Do we have an 
adequate assessment and standards tools to reverse the increasing cyber incidents?  What 
else can be done to accelerate the improvement of cybersecurity for critical infrastructure 
systems?  
The goal of this research was to attempt to answer these questions through a 
literature review, examining lessons learned from IDHS’ 2016 cyber exercise, and 
considering the applications of operational processes. 
1.3 Significance  
Critical infrastructure utilities nationally are still being subject to increasing 
number of annual cyber incidents despite available tools to assess cyber risks and 
standards to mitigate them. This study focused on the integration and application of 
current resources rather than create new industrial control cybersecurity tools as has been 
done time and again. The insights contained in this study could help utilities increase the 
mitigation rate of their cybersecurity vulnerabilities.  
1.4 Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this research was to describe, and analyze industrial control 
systems cyber vulnerabilities, available assessment and standards tools, vendors’ 
solutions trends, and operational concepts in combination with using lessons learned from 




improvement of critical infrastructure cyber security?” Understanding the “state of the 
art” for current cyber security tools and how to operationally apply them to the challenges 
faced by Indiana water utilities may lead to insights on how to reverse the nation’s 
continuing annual increases in industrial control systems’ cyber incidents. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The questions central to this research were: 
1. Are the current industrial control systems cyber security assessment tools, 
standards, and vendor solutions sufficient for Indiana water utilities? 
2. How do you accelerate improving industrial control systems cybersecurity for 
Indiana water utilities? 
3. Are there any additional constraints on improving cybersecurity for Indiana’s 
water utilities’ industrial controls systems? 
1.6 Assumptions 
The following assumptions were inherent to the pursuit of this study: 
1. Effective cybersecurity prevention through identification and protection measures 
will reduce critical infrastructure cybersecurity incidents more than detection, 
response, and recovery. 
2. Information officially published by industry, government, and academic subject 
matter experts is accurate and helpful. 
3. Vendor specifications for critical infrastructure industrial control systems 
cybersecurity solutions are accurate and helpful. 





5. Increasing number of cyber attackers may be a factor to the increasing number of 
annual cyber incidents. 
6. As a utility’s industrial control systems cyber vulnerabilities are decreased, some 
or most cyber attackers will migrate from that utility’s systems to easier and more 
lucrative targets.   
7. Some if not all industrial control system vendors are working to improve the 
cybersecurity of their systems but their solutions are works in process with some 
vendors leading others. 
1.7 Limitations 
The following limitations were inherent in the pursuit of this study: 
1. This study was limited to publicly available industry, federal, state, and academic 
open source information as of July 2016. 
2. This study was limited to only publicly releasable information on Indiana 
Department of Homeland Security’s cyber exercise Crit-Ex 16. 
3. Given Indiana Department of Homeland Security’s non-attribution commitment 
to utilities that participated in this year’s cyber exercise, quantitative data is not 
available for the lessons learned. 
4. Company profiles of Indiana water utilities from publicly available information 
are updated periodically and not constantly. 
5. The industrial control systems vendors referenced in this paper are not inclusive 
of all the industry vendors and their mention should not be considered an 





The following delimitations were inherent in the pursuit of this study: 
1. The lessons learned from participating Indiana water utilities during IDHS’s 2016 
cyber exercise may not reflect industrial control systems cyber security issues 
encountered by other Indiana critical infrastructure utilities or those in other 
states. 
2. Time and resources available limit the number of vendor industrial control 
systems cyber solutions referenced 
3. Analysis of State of Indiana cybersecurity programs’ organizations and processes 
are limited to publicly available open source information. 
1.9 Organization  
This thesis provides six major chapters and appendices. Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of industrial control systems and their inherent cyber vulnerabilities. The 
chapter then discusses standards and assessment tools for increasing industrial control 
systems cyber security, and trends in industrial control systems vendors’ cybersecurity 
solutions. 
Chapter 3 introduces organizational and operational concepts for accelerating 
improvement of critical infrastructure industrial control systems’ cybersecurity.  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of Indiana Department of Homeland Security’s 
Critical Infrastructure Exercise 2016 Water Utilities Cyber Exercise, lessons learned and 
the 2017 plans to mitigate capability gaps.  
Chapter 5 describes the requirements and methodology for analyzing how to 




Chapter 6 analyzes the lessons learned and capability gaps mitigation plans from 
this year’s IDHS water utilities cyber exercise to examine how industrial control systems 
cybersecurity tools, and operational concepts can accelerate increasing Indiana’s water 
utilities’ cyber security. 
Chapter 7 contains a summary of this document, the conclusion of the study, and 
discussion of the results and recommendations for future research. 
1.10 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview to the research project, including 
background, significance, purpose, research questions, and scope definitions.  The 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of industrial control systems found in critical 
infrastructures such as energy, water, and transportation and their vulnerabilities to cyber-
attacks.  The chapter then discusses assessment tools and standards for improving 
industrial control systems cybersecurity.  It finally concludes with trends in industrial 
control systems vendors’ cyber solutions. 
2.2 Fundamentals of Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 of May 1998 established the need for 
protecting the nation’s cyber-supported infrastructure sectors which includes, but are not 
limited to telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water 
systems, and emergency services, both governmental and private (Clinton, 1998).  The 
critical infrastructure is characterized by physical, cyber, geographic, and logical 
interdependencies and interacting components between sectors (Hentea, 2008).  
Industrial control systems support several of those critical infrastructure sectors.  
Industrial controls systems (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of 
controls systems including Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), distributed control 
systems (DCS), supervisory control, and data acquisition (SCADA) systems (Stouffer, 




Control systems can be used in several industry sectors to include manufacturing 
and distribution.  Use of manufacturing controls can be generally categorized for use in 
process-based and discrete-based manufacturing. Process-based manufacturing industries 
typically utilize either continuous manufacturing processes or batch manufacturing 
processes. Continuous manufacturing such as used in oil refineries or chemical 
distillation plants run continuously even during transitions for making different grades or 
products.  Batch manufacturing such as used in food production has distinct processing 
steps for a given quantity of material with the possibility of brief steady state operations 
within intermediate steps.  Discrete manufacturing such as used in producing mechanical 
or electronic parts typically conducts a series of steps on a single device to create the final 
product. 
Distribution industries such as natural gas pipelines, water distribution, and 
electrical power grids use industrial control systems geographically dispersed often over 
thousands of square miles. While the actual controls used in manufacturing and 
distribution industries are very similar in operation they differ in their environmental 
deployment.  Manufacturing industries usually operate within a confined factory or plant-
site with communications riding over a local area network (LAN) with robust and high 
speed performance. Distribution industries require long-distance communications over 
wide-area networks (WAN) and are subject to communication challenges such as delays 
and data loss posed by the various communications media required.  The various network 
types also introduce different security controls and challenges (Stouffer et al., 2015). 




manufacturing control system it has the added complexity of a WAN as shown in Figure 
2.1 to connect the Control Center to its Field Sites. 
A distribution SCADA system as depicted in Figure 2.1 has several components 
that perform specific functions (Stouffer et al., 2015)(Kambic, Smith, & Yang, 2013).  
They include: 
 
Figure 2.1. Distribution SCADA Systems (Stouffer et al., 2015) 
 
1. SCADA Master (MTU for Master Terminal Unit) - sends control commands and 
receives status data from remote terminal units (RTUs), intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs), and programmable logic controllers (PLCs).  The term “Master” 
is derived from the protocol given the SCADA initiates the commands, and the 
RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs respond as slaves.  
2. Human Machine Interface (HMI) - provides a graphic display and interface for 
operators.  HMI can either be a hardware/software solution, or a software 
application running on industry standard hardware and operating system (such as 




3. Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) – is a solid state device designed to 
replace previously used electrical relays using ladder logic.  PLCs have migrated 
from being programmed with ladder logic programming hardware terminals to 
software applications with intuitive interfacing.  PLCs provide core functionality 
for SCADA operations, but in situations requiring minimal inputs, outputs, and 
processing intelligent electronic devices can be used. 
4. Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) – are generally deployed in field sites and provide 
remote monitoring and control capability at unattended field sites.  RTUs support 
various communication means to include Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN), fiber optic cable, and radio/Microwave.  For some sites PLCs or IEDs 
can be used in lieu of RTUs. 
5. Application Servers – provide a variety of services in the Control Center to 
include data processing functions, real time operational process control, and 
maintaining historical data (for analysis, forecasting, training, accounting, etc.). 
6. I/O Servers – provide the communications front end to the system for data 
acquisition and responsible for collecting, buffering, and providing PLC, RTU, 
and IED process information. 
7. Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) – solid state technology has enabled various 
devices such as protective relays to communicate directly with a control server 
without a PLC or RTU. Local programming IEDs can provide a level of fault-




As shown in the generic control system architecture of Figure 2.2 control systems 
operations networks are usually integrated with the business enterprise network and 
potentially with external customers and vendors on the internet. 
 
Figure 2.2. Generic Control System Architecture (Mahan, Fluckiger, & Clements, 2011) 
 
Critical infrastructure organizations are under constant pressure to do more with 
less.  Facility owners and operators look at integrating their industrial controls’ 
operational networks with their business networks as a means for improving efficiency 
and productivity given financial, operational, and compliance restrictions limit their other 
options. Unfortunately, several of the automation and control systems on operational 




planned with a life span of twenty to thirty years and were initially designed and installed 
for reliability and speed and without cyber security considerations (Stouffer et al., 2015). 
2.3 Industrial Control System Cyber Vulnerabilities 
In addition, control systems have evolved from isolated proprietary 
hardware/software solutions in the 1970’s to open systems that include commercial off 
the shelf (COTS) personal computers, operating systems, TCP/IP communications, and 
internet access.  In other words, the cyber-vulnerable of industrial control systems that 
run our critical infrastructure systems, like our electrical distribution grid (with a required 
greater than 99.99% operational up time), have gained a significantly increased attack 
surface and have become vulnerable to the same attacks as the rest of the enterprise 
(Hentea, 2008). 
Evidence of this comes from the Department of Homeland Security’s Industrial 
Control Systems – Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) fiscal 2015 report 
noting ICS cyber incidents increase 20% (i.e. from 245 to 295).  Between 2014 and 2015 
the ICS-CERT reported cyber incidents for manufacturing increased from 69 to 97 (49% 
increase) and for water distribution from 14 to 25 (79% increase) (DHS ICS-CERT, 
2014, 2015).  Another example of increased critical infrastructure control systems’ 
vulnerability took place on December 23, 2014 when over 220,000 Ukrainian customers 
lost power for over five hours due to a cyber-attack.  The cyber-attack began months 
earlier with phishing emails that included BlackEnergy 3 malware infected Microsoft 
Word and Excel files and ended with the energy utilities’ industrial control systems used 




power supplies, and corruption of various utility systems with KillDisk malware  
(Kessler, 2016; Zetter, 2016). 
2.4 Tools for Increasing Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security 
 Given the increasing attacks on critical infrastructure industrial control systems, 
this section looks at tools available to enable a critical infrastructure organization to 
increase its ICS cybersecurity.  
During 2003 President Bush released “The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace”.  Included among several short and long term goals was for the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy to develop and update an annual federal research and 
development agenda to address several priorities to include intrusion detection, internet 
infrastructure security, applications security, communications security (including 
SCADA systems encryption and authentication) (The White House, 2003).  During 2013 
President Obama issued Executive Order 13636 which directed the development of a 
framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure (“The Cybersecurity 
Framework”) (The White House, 2013).  
As a result of the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the 2013 
Executive Order 13636, significant academic research and coordinated Federal 
government and private sector efforts resulted in standards and assessment tools to 
empower a critical infrastructure organization to increase its cyber security.   
2.4.1 Standards Tools 
 As directed by Executive Order 13636 through the Secretary of Commerce, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) led the development of the 




than 3,000 security professionals NIST published on February 2014 the “Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (NIST, 2014; PwC, 2014).  Assembled 
from standards, guidelines, and practices that have worked in industry, the CF provides 
organization and structure to multiple approaches to cyber security. 
The CF focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity activities and 
considering cybersecurity risks as part of an organization’s risk management process. The 
CF consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and the 
Framework Implementation Tiers (NIST, 2014).   
1. The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and 
information references common to all critical infrastructure sectors, and provides 
detailed guidance for developing specific organizational Profiles.   
2. The Framework Profiles help organizations align their cybersecurity activities 
with their business requirements, risk tolerance, and resources. 
3. The Framework Tiers provide a mechanism for organizations to view 
cybersecurity risk and the processes to manage that risk.  Tiers can range from 
Partial (Tier 1) to Adaptive (Tier 4) with the higher tiers numbers requiring a 
greater investment of resources and effort, but in turn providing greater 
cybersecurity. 
As shown in Figure 2.3 the Framework Core is organized in a listing of Functions, 







Figure 2.3. Framework Core Functions and Categories (NIST, 2014) 
Each Function Category in turn has Subcategories, and Information References (i.e. 








Figure 2.4. Framework Category’s Subcategories and References (NIST, 2014) 
To summarize the Cybersecurity Framework provides a critical infrastructure 
organization a repeatable process leveraging best practices (i.e. standards, guidelines, and 
processes) to increase and maintain its cybersecurity based on its business requirements, 
risk tolerances, and resources. 
2.4.2 Assessment Tool 
The Industrial Control Systems – Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) 
has made available and supports a Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET). CSET 
provides a systematic, disciplined, and repeatable approach for an organization to 
evaluate its security posture.  It is a free downloadable software tool for Microsoft 




industrial control systems and information technology security practices.  Users can 
select from a portfolio of recognized industry and government standards and 
recommendations what is appropriate for their operations. 
CSET helps users assess their operational and informational systems 
cybersecurity practices through a series of detailed questions about their systems 
components and architectures as well as operational policies and procedures based on 
accepted cybersecurity standards.  Once the questionnaires are completed, CSET 
produces charts and reports showing areas of strength and weakness, and a prioritized 
recommendations list for increasing cybersecurity (DHS ICS-CERT, 2016).   
ICS-CERT recommends using CSET with a cross functional team as follows: 
1. Select Standards - Users can select one or more government and industry 
recognized cybersecurity standards.  CSET will generate questions specific to 
those requirements. 
2. Determine Assurance Level - The security assurance level (SAL) is determined 
by responses to potential consequences of an effective cyber-attack on an ICS 
organization, facility, system, or subsystem.  The SAL can be selected or 
calculated and provides a recommended level of cybersecurity rigor necessary to 
protect against worst-case events. 
3. Create the Diagram – Users can create a diagram from scratch or import an 
existing MS Visio diagram into CSET’s graphical user interface.  Users can then 





4. Answer the Questions – CSET then generates questions using the network 
topology, selected security standards, and SAL as its basis.  To assist with the 
questions CSET provides help through supplemental text, and additional 
resources. 
5. Review Analysis and Reports – CSET provides an Analysis dashboard with 
interactive graphs and tables that present assessment in both summary and 
detailed form.  Professionally designed reports can be printed to facilitate 
coordination, communications, and synchronization with management and staff 
members.  
2.5 Vendors’ Cybersecurity Solutions Trends 
Industrial control systems vendors like GE, Modicon, and Rockwell Automation 
have noted the increased infrastructure cybersecurity requirements and are building 
greater cybersecurity capabilities into their respective products (General Electric, 2012; 
Rockwell Automation, 2013; Schneider Electric, 2015).  An example of this is the 
collaborative effort between Rockwell Automation, CISCO, and Panduit to educate their 
shared customers and offer new products with integrated cybersecurity features.  To 
address new and legacy industrial control systems without cybersecurity capabilities, 
companies like Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories provide cybersecurity components 
and engineering solutions (Bartman & Carson, 2015).  Critical infrastructure 
organizations can now begin to find industrial controls cybersecurity options that didn’t 







 In this chapter we learned several aspects pertaining to critical infrastructure 
industrial control systems.  We covered the fundamentals of critical infrastructure 
industrial control systems and how they were initially designed for speed, and reliability 
on isolated networks and without cybersecurity in mind.  Subsequently industrial control 
systems and their operational networks have increasingly become more cyber vulnerable 
as they have been connected to the internet for remote access and integrated with 
enterprise networks to improve business efficiency and productivity.  We also learned 
that as a result of increased governmental and private collaborative hard work, critical 
infrastructure organizations now have available robust tools to assess and increase their 
cyber security posture, based on their business requirements, risk tolerances, and 
resources.  In addition, industrial control systems vendors and their partners are offering 
industrial control components with cybersecurity options that simply didn’t exist just a 
few years ago.  However, despite the availability of cybersecurity tools, and vendor 
solutions over the past two years there has not been a decline in critical infrastructure 
cyber-attacks over the same period.  This paper aims to address possible solutions, and 





CHAPTER 3. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR ACCELERATING 
CYBERSECURITY  
3.1 Background 
During his Command of the U.S. Cyber Command, Admiral Michael Rodgers 
called cybersecurity “the ultimate team sport”.  Speaking at the Reagan National Defense 
Forum on November 15, 2014 Admiral Rogers went on to say, “There is no single sector 
element of this population, there is no single element within the government that has the 
total answer.  It will take all of us working together to make this work” (SecureWorld, 
2014). 
The availability of best practices for cybersecurity tools and new hardware, 
network, and software solutions will not accelerate industrial controls cybersecurity 
without a joint effort between public and private sectors. Borrowing from the Department 
of Defense’s processes for identifying capability gaps, organizing, and operating large 
and complex missions, this section will describe functional areas, and organization and 
operational concepts for accelerating cybersecurity increases. 
3.2 Cybersecurity Functional Areas Capability Gap Analysis 
 When preparing to execute a significant, complex, and difficult goal or objective 
(i.e. critical infrastructure cybersecurity) how do you systematically inventory your 
capabilities so that gaps can be identified and addressed? When mission stakes are large 




process for analyzing all the elements required for success.  Those elements are Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy 
(DOTMLPF-P).   By analyzing required DOTMLPF-P elements, capability gaps can be 
identified and addressed (Defense Acquistion University, 2016). 
Figure 3.1 below translates the “definitional intent” of DoD DOTMLPF-P 
Elements to Cybersecurity Functional Areas in order to make them relevant for 
improving ICS cybersecurity capability gap analysis. 
 
 






3.3 Organizational and Synchronization Concepts for Accelerating Cybersecurity 
 For the “cybersecurity team sport” to succeed with a public and private “coalition 
of the willing,” organization is required.  The organization requires processes to optimize 
coordination and synchronization between the various public and private entities and 
overcome a common tendency for knowledge and expertise to “stovepipe” due to the 
sheer number of actions for which each entity is normally responsible. 
 When organizing a “coalition of the willing” to be successful with a challenge as 
complex as increasing critical infrastructure cybersecurity, how do you create venues 
through which the cross-functional expertise and capabilities are brought to bear on 
planning and executing solutions?  When conducting large and complex Joint Operations 
involving several departments, agencies, local governments, other nations, and non-
governmental organizations, DoD uses Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working 
Groups (B2C2WGs) (Becker, 2013).    
Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, Working Groups and Operational Planning 
Teams are roles with defined responsibilities for increasing cross-functional integration, 
and improve support.  Given a “coalition of the willing” cybersecurity team is different 
than DoD’s command centric structure, Figure 3.2 translates B2C2WG roles and 










Figure 3.2. B2C2WG Roles and Responsibilities with Indiana Cybersecurity Examples 
  
 B2C2WG roles and responsibilities are necessary but not sufficient to accelerate 
increasing cybersecurity.  A Synchronization Rhythm (called Battle Rhythm in Joint 
Operations) is required to regulate the flow of information to support decision cycles for 
planning and execution.   With the State of Indiana as an example, establishing a 
Synchronization Rhythm will be predicated on the Indiana Executive Council on 




measurable, achievable, and relevant to be accomplished in an established timeline 
(Pence, 2016).   
Once the time lined objectives are established a Synchronization Rhythm can be 
established using a model developed by the Joint Planning Support Element of United 
States Transportation Command as follows (Houk & Cushing, 2014). 
1. Given objectives, establish an optimal number of cross-functional staff elements 
(i.e. Cells, Working Groups, or Operational Planning Teams) to support the 
IECoC’s decision cycles. The vetting process (called a 7 Minute Drill in Joint 
Operations) should be decided upon by a designee acting as a “chief of staff” to 
ensure only required cross-functional elements are implemented, given limited 
time and manpower. 
2. Afterwards a flow-chart diagram should be used to depict the Synchronization 
Rhythm events situated on the planning and execution horizons with input and 
output relationships shown as connections.  This helps leaders and the entire 
cybersecurity team visualize information exchange requirements connections, 
critical paths of information, and how decision cycles are supported. 
3. To ensure there aren’t any staffing constraints, a staff matrix should be cross 
referenced against the Synchronization Rhythm flow chart.  The cross referenced 
staff matrix will help the “chief of staff” or IECoC manage priorities for 
supporting Synchronization Rhythm events. 
4. Finally, the Synchronization Rhythm events should be scheduled in calendar-style 




resources, and codify the sequence of events that best support the information 
exchange elements of the IECoC and staff. 
The optimal number of cross-functional staff elements and frequency of Synchronization 
Rhythm events will be constrained by the resources the cybersecurity team’s “coalition of 
the willing” can support.   
3.4 The Stop Light Chart 
 A Stop Light Chart is a simple approach for tracking and encouraging 
organizational changes in either a compliance required or voluntary environment.  
Additionally, Stop Light Charts can be initiated with or without a DOTMLPF-P analysis 
and/or establishing a B2C2WG and Synchronization Rhythm.  In a “coalition of the 
willing” environment a Stop Light Chart might be accepted by organizations being 
tracked by anonymizing listed organizations so that collectively the cybersecurity team 
may be able to identify constraints to collective success.  For example, the Stop Light 
Chart in Figure 3.1 may be indicating there is a systemic constraint in addressing 





Figure 3.3. Cyber Prevention Status for Participating Indiana Water Utilities 
 
3.5 Summary 
 This chapter begins with highlighting how the best standards, assessments, and 
cybersecure industrial controls will not improve cybersecurity without a joint effort 
between public and private organizations deploying those assets.  Just having a 
cybersecurity team is a necessary but not sufficient condition for cybersecurity success. 
To increase critical infrastructures’ cybersecurity there also needs to be a cybersecurity 
capabilities gap analysis in order to identify and mitigate shortfalls and organizational 
and synchronization processes to optimize the cybersecurity team’s effectiveness and 
speed.  Thus this chapter lays out operational concepts to be referenced in the analysis of 
lessons learned from Indiana’s 2016 cyber exercise of several water utility companies 




CHAPTER 4. OVERVIEW OF INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY’S CYBER EXERCISE FOR WATER UTILITIES 
4.1 Background 
 
April of 2016, Governor Pence issued an executive order establishing the Indiana 
Executive Council on Cybersecurity.  The Cybersecurity Council’s goals include 
formalizing strategic cybersecurity, and strengthening best practices to protect 
information technology infrastructure (Pence, 2016).  The State of Indiana has 
aggressively embraced the “cybersecurity team” concept and purposely adopted a culture 
of collaboration between government organizations, private firms, non-profits, and 
academia in order to provide its citizens a robust response and resilience to a major cyber 
incident (Wong, Rapp, Mike, May, & Blog, 2016). 
The Indiana Department of Homeland Security (IDHS) has led with this team 
approach to counter cyberattacks intent on degrading Indiana’s economic capacity and 
threatening critical services to its citizens.  During 2016 IDHS focused on Indiana’s 
regulated utility companies’ cybersecurity with exercises that follow the Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.  This ensures standardization in metrics and 





The Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP) employs a common 
methodology to ensure a consistent approach to exercise design and development, 
conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning as depicted in Figure 4.1 
 
Figure 4.1. HSEEP Exercise Cycle (Homeland Security, 2013) 
To build awareness and allow participating organizations from across the public 
and private sectors IDHS hosted Critical Infrastructure Exercise 16.2 also known as Crit-
Ex 16.2 at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center during May 18-19, 2016 (Staggs, 
2016).  IDHS in conjunction with the Indiana National Guard, Indiana Office of 
Technology, and over 17 other public and private partners developed a controlled 
functional cyberattack exercise.  Members of several Indiana water utilities participated 
in Crit-Ex 16.2’s live play exercise in which a cyber-attack was launched on 
Muscatatuck’s water plant’s industrial control systems resulting in physical problems 




committed to providing only verbal exercise evaluations and not retaining “report cards” 
or any quantitative data. 
4.2 Lessons Learned 
From Crit-Ex 16.2 after action reviews, the Indiana Department of Homeland 
Security noted the following lessons learned (DeMedeiros, 2016): 
1. Many smaller water, power and emergency management organizations do not 
consider cybersecurity to apply to them, or have an undeveloped 
understanding of the risks they face.  
2. Few smaller water utilities, electric co-ops and emergency management 
agencies (EMAs) have cyber response plans or standard operating procedures 
(EOPs)/emergency operating procedures that factor in the cyber element.  
3. Few organizations have factored cascading effects and the needs associated 
with them into EOPs. 
4. Private-industry players do not understand basic principles of emergency 
management and are not well integrated into emergency response.  
5. Cyber response resources and reporting protocols are not widely known.  
6. Across the board, EOPs are rarely aligned with critical response stakeholders.  
Given the after actions reviews, IDHS noted Indiana’s smaller utilities’ lack of 
cybersecurity and risks awareness as well as their lack of cyber response plans or cyber 
standard operating procedures/emergency operating procedures.  In other words, 





4.3 Capabilities Gap Mitigation Plans 
To address the above noted deficiencies IDHS for 2017 is focusing on exercises 
for building out cyber capabilities of small to medium-sized organizations with the 
following objectives (DeMedeiros, 2016): 
1. Educate participants on their cyber risk profile and build cyber awareness.  
2. Build understanding of cyber risk and mitigation resources in the water, 
power, and emergency management sectors.  
3. Help small to medium-sized water and power utilities to write cyber incident 
response plans.  
4. Enable water utilities to exercise their response capabilities in an operations-
based “functional” exercise located at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center.  
When IDHS’ 2017 exercises are successfully completed, participating small to 
medium-sized organizations will increase their cyber and risk awareness, and response 
plans and procedures.  
4.4 Summary 
Indiana’s inaugural cyber exercise, IDHS’s Crit-Ex 16.2 successfully met its 
objectives of building a public and private sector exercise team to increase awareness 
within Indiana’s water utility companies.  The exercise revealed Indiana’s small water 
utilities’ lack of cybersecurity awareness and capabilities. The following chapter will 
describe the methodology for analyzing how to accelerate increasing Indiana’s water 





CHAPTER 5.  METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter will layout the research methodology for examining the results from 
IDHS’s 2016 functional Critical Infrastructure Exercise (Crit-Ex 16.2) and the Indiana 
Executive Council on Cybersecurity to identify capability gaps and operational concepts 
that may need to be addressed to the accelerate reduction of potential Indiana water 
utilities’ cybersecurity incidents. 
5.2 Research Methodology 
1. The Cybersecurity Framework Core Functions was used to analyze both Crit-Ex 
16.2 lessons learned and capabilities gap mitigation plan in order to identify how 
cybersecurity incidents can be reduced.  
2. The Functional Areas was used to analyze Procedures, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Regulations as they apply to 
Indiana water utilities for sufficiency. 
3. The B2C2WG (Boards, Bureaus, Cells, Centers, and Working Groups) was used 
to analyze the cybersecurity team as it applies to the Indiana water utilities for 
sufficiency. 
4. The Synchronization Rhythm was analyzed as it applies to the cybersecurity team 




5. The previous four analyses were summarized to identify positive and negative 
operational trends, identified constraints and unknowns.  
5.3 Overview of Analysis Expectations 
The analysis identified the following: 
1. What actions to reduce infrastructure cyber-attacks were identified during 
Crit-Ex 16.2? 
2. What capability gaps need to be addressed? 
3. What organizational optimization actions can be taken? 
4. What operational optimization actions can be taken? 
5.4  Summary 
This chapter discussed the research methodology and analysis expectations.  It 
also describes the frameworks that was used to examine what may be required to 





CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the results from IDHS’s 2016 Critical Infrastructure Exercise 
(Crit-Ex 16.2) and the Indiana Executive Council on Cybersecurity to identify capability 
gaps and operational concepts that may need to be addressed to the accelerate reduction 
of potential Indiana water utilities’ cybersecurity incidents 
6.2 Cybersecurity Framework Core Functions Analysis 
This section applies NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework’s Core Functions to the 
Crit-Ex Lessons Learned and the 2017 exercise objectives for mitigating identified 
capabilities gaps (Appendix A).   The Functions organize cybersecurity activities at their 
highest level and are Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.  Their definitions 
from pages 8-9 of NIST Cybersecurity Framework are as follows (NIST, 2014): 
1. Identify – Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk 
to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.  
2. Protect – Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of 
critical infrastructure services.  
3. Detect – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the 
occurrence of a cybersecurity event.  Respond – Develop and implement the 




4. Respond – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action 
regarding a detected cybersecurity event. 
5. Recover – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for 
resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a 
cybersecurity event.  
Given prevention is the best means to reduce damaging cybersecurity incidents for 
purposes of this analysis the Identify and Protect Functions are considered “Prevention” 
and Direct, Respond, and Recover are considered “Incident Response”. 
 
Figure 6.1. Preventative vs Responsive Analysis of Crit-Ex Lessons Learned 
 Analysis of Crit-Ex Lessons Learned as shown in Figure 6.1 resulted in 
identifying two prevention deficiencies and eleven incident response deficiencies.  As a 
result of the Lessons Learned, the Indiana Department of Homeland Security identified 
cybersecurity capability gaps and established 2017 exercise objectives to increase cyber 





Figure 6.2. Preventative vs Responsive Analysis of 2017 Exercise Objectives 
 As shown in Figure 6.2 a Functions Analysis of the 2017 exercise objectives 
revealed a continued emphasis on incidence response.  Reducing cybersecurity incidents 
will require an increased emphasis on prevention actions in addition to education. 
6.3 Functional Areas Capability Gaps Analysis  
This section analyzes the cybersecurity Functional Areas of Procedures, 
Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Facilities, and Regulations as they apply to 
increasing cybersecurity for Indiana water utility companies.  In addition to Crit-Ex this 
analysis also referenced NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework, ICS-CERT’s Cyber Security 
Evaluation Tool, the Indiana Executive Cybersecurity Council (Appendix B), Industrial 
Control Systems Vendors’ cybersecure solutions, Indiana Code (Appendix C) and a 
OneSource Database list of Indiana water utilities companies (Appendix D).  The focus 
of this analysis is to identify capability gaps that might constrain reducing cybersecurity 
incidents. 
 Given the availability of NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework, the Cyber Security 
Evaluation Tool, and ICS Vendors’ cybersecure solutions, Procedures, and Materiel 




treatment and distribution Facilities also didn’t pose any known capability gaps.  Training 
and Leadership are known capability gaps that have been recognized and are being 
addressed as a result of Crit-Ex.  Organization is noted as capability gap being addressed 
given that the Indiana Executive Council on Cybersecurity was formed  April of this year 
and will require time to develop its Synchronization Rhythm.  
 
Figure 6.3. Indiana Water Utilities Cybersecurity Functional Area Analysis 
 As depicted in Figure 6.3 Personnel and Regulations are two Functional Areas 
that have unaddressed capability gaps.  Crit-Ex Lessons Learned revealed that several of 
the small water utilities lacked cybersecurity awareness and any plans to address the 
risks, which likely means that they lack qualified personnel.  In order to scope the 
magnitude of the personnel problem I queried the Purdue Library’s OneSource Global 




number of their respective employees (Appendix D).  Figure 6.4 shows most water utility 
companies have five or less employees (188 of the 325 (57.8%)). 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Number of Indiana Water Companies Based on Number of Employees 
Please note that given time available the 325 listed companies were not 
individually contacted to verify if the publicly available information is current.  However, 
assuming there may be some outdated employee counts, the distribution of companies 
with five or less employees is significant enough to note that several small water utility 
companies may be unable to afford a full time cybersecurity employee. 
 Regulations is listed as an unaddressed capability gap given Indiana Code 









































water utilities financial relief for compliance with federal requirements to upgrade and 
maintain their cybersecurity.  The cybersecurity upgrading and subsequent cybersecurity 
maintenance costs may be unaffordable for small companies with five employees or less. 
6.4 Boards, Bureaus, Cells, Centers, and Working Groups Organization Analysis 
The “cybersecurity team sport” is dependent upon cross-functional integration 
between public and private sector members and B2C2WG roles and responsibilities 
supporting that integration.
 
Figure 6.5. Indiana Water Utilities’ Cybersecurity B2C2WG Analysis 
 As shown in Figure 6.5 Boards, Bureaus, and Centers are shown without any 
known capability gaps given the existence of the Indiana Executive Council on 
Cybersecurity, NIST, and the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 




addressed given IDHS has continued leading the public and private partners supporting 
the Indiana Cybersecurity Exercise Series.  An assessment of the Operational Planning 
Teams is not possible due the absence of publicly available information.  
6.5 Synchronization Rhythm Analysis 
As shown in Figure 6.6, given the absence of publicly available information it isn’t 
possible to assess capability gaps for the Synchronization Rhythm. 
 








This chapter applied several analyses from an operational perspective to find ways 
to increase the “preventative” cyber security of Indiana water utilities and reduce 
potential damaging cyber incidents.  As shown in Figure 6.7 the analyses revealed that 
current IDHS training and action emphasis is on the response to a damaging cyber 
incident, versus preventing in order to avoid the damage in the first place.  The analyses 
also revealed increasing cyber security is constrained by qualified personnel and 
cybersecurity upgrades and maintenance due to greater than 50% of Indiana water utility 
companies being small and having five or fewer employees.  Indiana’s water utility 
companies can’t simply pass on the additional cyber manpower and upgrade costs to their 
consumers because the rates they can charge are regulated. 
 
Figure 6.7. Analyses Summary Matrix 
 The analyses also revealed, that the major cross-functional organizational 




members of the cybersecurity team, increasing preventative cybersecurity for Indiana’s 





CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This study has delved into the cybersecurity of Indiana water utilities and assessing 
its status and how to improve it using the functional exercise at Muscatatuck Urban 
Training Center.  Each of the questions addressed were intended to reveal how to 
accelerate the improvement of cybersecurity for critical infrastructure industrial control 
systems.  To conclude this document, this chapter summarizes the study, and revisits the 
research questions, its significance, and methodology.  The chapter then provides 
summative comments based on its findings.  It concludes with future study 
recommendations for increasing Indiana’s water utilities’ cybersecurity. 
7.1 Summary of This Study 
This study examined open source assessment and standards tools, vendor’s 
cybersecurity solutions, operational concepts, and Crit-Ex 16.2 lessons learned and 
capability gaps improvement objectives.  Its purpose was to assess, describe, and analyze 
the integrations of currently available cybersecurity tools, vendor solutions, operational 
concepts and lessons learned and answer the question, “How do you accelerate 
improvement of critical infrastructures’ industrial control systems cyber security?”.  
Additional cyber security tools and vendor solutions maybe necessary, but they are not 





7.2 Research Questions 
The question central to this research were:  
1. Are the current industrial control systems cyber security assessment tools, 
standards, and vendor solutions sufficient for Indiana water utilities?  The 
literature review revealed that as a result of increased governmental and private 
collaborative work, critical infrastructure organizations have robust tools to access 
and increase their security posture, based on their business requirements, risk 
tolerances, and resources.  In addition, industrial control systems vendors and 
their partners are offering cybersecure control systems components that didn’t 
exist just a few years ago. 
2. How do you accelerate improving industrial control systems cybersecurity for 
Indiana water utilities?  Applying operational concepts analyses to the 
cybersecurity findings of participating Indiana water utilities revealed a need to 
focus cybersecurity training and preparation more on prevention.  The analyses 
also revealed that Indiana’s cybersecurity team has the organizational building 
blocks to accelerate improvements in the cybersecurity of its water utilities and 
predicated on how those organizational building blocks synchronize their efforts 
improvements maybe further accelerated. 
3. Are there any additional constraints on improving cybersecurity for Indiana’s 
water utilities’ industrial controls systems?  The operational concepts analyses 
revealed that given over 50% of Indiana’s water utility companies have five or 
less employees and regulated revenue their ability to man and fund cybersecurity 




revealed that water utilities do not have a process to request relief from federally 
mandated cybersecurity improvements costs (Appendix C). 
7.3 Significance of This Study 
The literature review revealed little attention had focused on using operational 
concepts to accelerate the reversal of the annual rate of cybersecurity incidents.  Instead 
the expansive literature addressed cybersecurity assessments, standards, and hardware 
and software solutions.   
Because of the nature of the question posed, a holistic approach was taken to 
examine the “state of the art” of cybersecurity tools, and vendor solutions and operational 
concepts for addressing the problems of increasing cybersecurity incidents.  After finding 
cybersecurity tools and vendor solutions sufficient, this study focused on the integration 
of what is currently available with procedures, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, personnel, facilities, and regulations to plan and execute increased 
cybersecurity.  It is hoped that the insights contained in this study will help increase 
cybersecurity not only for Indiana’s water utility industrial control systems, but also for 
those of other critical infrastructures throughout the nation. 
7.4 Methodology of This Study 
This study used the literature review and analysis of several criteria assessments to 
address the research questions.  Specifically, the literature review was used to analyze the 
sufficiency of current standards, assessments, and vendor cyber solutions.  The assessed 
criteria were Cybersecurity Framework Core Functions (i.e. Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, Recover), Functional Areas (i.e. Procedures, Organization, Training, Materiel, 




Cells, Centers, and Working Groups), and Synchronization Rhythm.  Afterwards the 
analyses of the four assessed criteria were summarized to identify positive and negative 
operational trends, identify constraints, and unknowns. 
7.5 Implications for Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security 
The currently available cybersecurity tools, and vendor solutions are sufficient to 
increase Indiana’s water utilities’ cybersecurity.  Using operational concepts helped 
identify that implementation those cybersecurity tools and vendor solutions are 
constrained because of limited available funding and number of company employees, and 
regulations.  The removal of those constraints will help accelerate implementation of 
preventative cybersecurity technology and procedures.  Predicated on additional data on 
Indiana’s cybersecurity team’s organization and how it synchronizes, further operational 
concepts analysis may reveal recommendations for accelerating improvements even 
more. 
7.6 Recommendations for Future Studies 
As with any study, hindsight highlights many things that could have been done 
differently or better.  The following are acknowledgement of these. 
1. Further investigation to confirm the cybersecurity risk in water utility companies 
of five employees or less.  Given that OneSource lists over fifty percent of 
Indiana’s 325 water utility companies employing five or less employees the 
listing should be surveyed to check for accuracy.  There may be some companies 
that are incorrectly listed, no longer in business, undergone a name change, and 




this investigation will help scope possible solutions for increasing cybersecurity 
for water utilities. 
2. Further investigation into the initial and ongoing costs of implementing 
preventative cybersecurity measures in water utility companies of five employees 
or less.  Given the limited revenues water utilities with small number of 
employees have, identifying costs will help with determine the magnitude of any 
funding shortfalls. 
3. Further investigation into options for Indiana water utilities to fund their initial 
and ongoing preventative cybersecurity solutions.  Will a State funding 
appropriation or an Indiana Code change be required to provide water utilities 
relief from the costs to meet cybersecurity requirements?  How might it make 
sense for small water utility companies to cooperatively fund cybersecurity 
professionals since available revenues will make it difficult for each company to 
hire a dedicated cybersecurity expert. 
4. Further investigation into how Indiana’s cybersecurity team is organized, and 
synchronized to identify how preventative cybersecurity could be implement 
faster not only for water utilities but also for Indiana’s other critical 
infrastructures.  The organization and synchronization of Indiana’s cybersecurity 
team will be predicated on the what the “coalition of the willing” can resource, 





While these are likely only some of the questions that readers of this work may ask, 
they are ones that can help to improve the State of Indiana’s water utilities cybersecurity 
posture. 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter has concluded the documentation of this study by revisiting the efforts 
that were part of it.  This chapter presented holistic answers to the primary questions 
posed at the beginning of the study.  It is hoped that it provides the reader with a new 
perspective for approaching the major effort required to increase the cybersecurity of just 
one critical infrastructure sector in one state.  Finally, the concluding section of the 
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Appendix D  OneSource Listing of Indiana Water Companies 
Indiana NAIC 22131 Companies (Water Supply) 
 
Company City Employees State Sales USD (mil) 
Argos Water Department Argos 1 Indiana  
Burnt Pines Water Associates North Vernon 1 Indiana 0.3 
D B I Services & Maintenance Columbia City 1 Indiana 0.3 
Decatur Water Superintendent Decatur 1 Indiana 0.3 
Eaton Water Department Eaton 1 Indiana 0.3 
Fayette Township Water Association New Goshen 1 Indiana 0.3 
Finch Newton Water Inc Chrisney 1 Indiana 0.3 
Fort Branch Water Department Fort Branch 1 Indiana  
Hogan Water Corp Aurora 1 Indiana 0.3 
Indiana American Water Co Somerset 1 Indiana 0.3 
Long Beach Water Department Long Beach 1 Indiana 0.3 
Moses' Water Works Bloomington 1 Indiana 0.3 
Mulberry Water Works Mulberry 1 Indiana 0.3 
New Paris Waste Water Treament New Paris 1 Indiana 0.3 
Ruark Well Drilling & Services Rockville 1 Indiana 0.3 
Southern Madison Utilities Lapel 1 Indiana 0.3 
St Paul Water Co St Paul 1 Indiana 0.3 
Topeka Water Department Topeka 1 Indiana 0.3 
Town-Hudson Clerk Treasurer Hudson 1 Indiana  
Wedgewood Park Water Co Inc Granger 1 Indiana 0.3 
Wheatland Water Department Wheatland 1 Indiana 0.3 
Alexandria Water Department Alexandria 2 Indiana 0.5 
Ashley Water Department Ashley 2 Indiana 0.5 
Berne Water Works Berne 2 Indiana 0.5 
Braunie's Bar Tell City 2 Indiana 0.5 
Canaan Utilities Corp Madison 2 Indiana 0.5 
Clinton Water Utility Clinton 2 Indiana 0.5 
Converse Water Works Converse 2 Indiana 0.5 
Cromwell City Water Department Cromwell 2 Indiana 0.5 
Dana Water Department Dana 2 Indiana 0.5 
Elnora Water Department Elnora 2 Indiana 0.5 
Fortville Water Department Fortville 2 Indiana 0.5 
Freelandville Water Department Freelandville 2 Indiana 0.5 
Fremont Water Department Fremont 2 Indiana 0.5 
Gosport Municipal Utility Gosport 2 Indiana 0.5 
Hendricks County Water Department Danville 2 Indiana 0.5 
Holland Water Plant Holland 2 Indiana 0.5 
Indiana American Water Co Winchester 2 Indiana 0.5 
Indiana Rural Water Associates Nashville 2 Indiana 0.5 
Kentland Water Works Kentland 2 Indiana 0.5 
Kingsford Heights Water Works Kingsford Hts 2 Indiana 0.5 
Kouts Village Water Department Kouts 2 Indiana 0.5 





Lagrange Water Works Lagrange 2 Indiana 0.5 
Millersburg Water Department Millersburg 2 Indiana 0.5 
Monon Water Plant Monon 2 Indiana 0.5 
Monticello Water Works Monticello 2 Indiana 0.5 
Mt Summit Water Treatmnt Plnt Mt Summit 2 Indiana 0.5 
Munster Water Billing Munster 2 Indiana 0.5 
Otwell Water Department Otwell 2 Indiana 0.5 
Painted Hills Utility Co Martinsville 2 Indiana 0.5 
Rabb Water Systems Inc Kokomo 2 Indiana 0.5 
Redkey Water Plant Redkey 2 Indiana 0.5 
Salem Water Works Office Salem 2 Indiana 0.5 
Sewage Disposal Plant Sheridan 2 Indiana 0.5 
Sheridan Water Works Sheridan 2 Indiana 0.5 
Southern Monroe Water Corp Bloomington 2 Indiana 0.5 
Staunton Town Hall Staunton 2 Indiana  
Town Of Hamilton Water Department Hamilton 2 Indiana 0.5 
Westport Water Department Westport 2 Indiana  
Whiting City Water Department Whiting 2 Indiana 0.5 
Wolcott Water Works Wolcott 2 Indiana 0.5 
American Water Operations & 
Maintenance 
Clay City 3 Indiana 0.8 
Aqua Indiana Inc Pendleton 3 Indiana 0.8 
Bloomington City Bloomington 3 Indiana 0.8 
Blue River Regional Water Milltown 3 Indiana 0.8 
Brook Water Department Brook 3 Indiana 0.8 
Brookville City Water Works Brookville 3 Indiana 0.8 
Brookville Town Utilities Brookville 3 Indiana 0.8 
Brookville Water Works Brookville 3 Indiana 0.8 
Carthage Water Plant Carthage 3 Indiana 0.8 
Centerville Water Works Centerville 3 Indiana 0.8 
Clinton Township Water Co Inc Clinton 3 Indiana 0.8 
Dunkirk Water Department Dunkirk 3 Indiana 0.8 
Dupont Water Co Dupont 3 Indiana 0.8 
East Fort Water Inc Shoals 3 Indiana 0.8 
Everton Water Corp Connersville 3 Indiana 0.8 
Fairmount Water Works Fairmount 3 Indiana 0.8 
Georgetown Water Department Georgetown 3 Indiana 0.8 
Greencastle Water Works Greencastle 3 Indiana 0.8 
Hayden Water Association North Vernon 3 Indiana 0.8 
Hillsdale Water Corp Hillsdale 3 Indiana 0.8 
Holton Community Water Holton 3 Indiana 0.8 
Huntington Water Works Department Huntington 3 Indiana 0.8 
Ireland Utilities Inc Jasper 3 Indiana 0.8 
Kingsbury Utility Corp Kingsbury 3 Indiana 0.8 
Kingsbury Utility Corp Kingsbury 3 Indiana 0.8 
La Crosse Water Department La Crosse 3 Indiana 0.8 
Lawrence Utilities LLC Indianapolis 3 Indiana 0.8 
Ligonier Water Works Ligonier 3 Indiana 0.8 





Napoleon Rural Water Corp Napoleon 3 Indiana 0.8 
North Dearborn Water Corp Brookville 3 Indiana 0.8 
Odon Water Odon 3 Indiana 0.8 
Princeton Water Department Princeton 3 Indiana 0.8 
Rural Water LLC Bloomington 3 Indiana 0.8 
Shorewood Forest Utilities Valparaiso 3 Indiana 0.8 
Silver Lake Water Department Silver Lake 3 Indiana  
St Henry Water Corp Ferdinand 3 Indiana 0.8 
Swayzee Water Works Swayzee 3 Indiana 0.8 
Syracuse Water Department Syracuse 3 Indiana  
Town Of Rockville Rockville 3 Indiana  
Townhall Utility Office Poseyville 3 Indiana 0.8 
Van Buren Water Works Van Buren 3 Indiana 0.8 
Water Department Dale 3 Indiana  
Water Department Garage Ferdinand 3 Indiana 0.8 
Alfordsville Water Utility Loogootee 4 Indiana 1.1 
American Water Greenwood 4 Indiana 1.1 
And Tro Water Authority Tell City 4 Indiana 1.1 
B B P Water Corp Spencer 4 Indiana 1.1 
Brazil Water Works Brazil 4 Indiana 1.1 
Brook Town Sewer Department Brook 4 Indiana 1.1 
Brooklyn Water Department Mooresville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Butler City Water Plant Butler 4 Indiana 1.1 
Carroll County Water District Vevay 4 Indiana 1.1 
Chlorination Co Inc Salem 4 Indiana 1.1 
Clay City Water Works Clay City 4 Indiana 1.1 
Decatur County Rural Greensburg 4 Indiana 1.1 
Fort Branch Water Department Fort Branch 4 Indiana 1.1 
Freelandville Water Plant Bicknell 4 Indiana 1.1 
Glenwood Water Works Glenwood 4 Indiana 1.1 
Greensburg Water Department Greensburg 4 Indiana  
Greenville Water Utility Greenville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Hartford City Water Plant Hartford City 4 Indiana 1.1 
Hope Utilities Garage Hope 4 Indiana 1.1 
Indiana American Water Co Mooresville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Indiana Rural Water Associates Zionsville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Kent Water Co Madison 4 Indiana 1.1 
Kingman Town Hall Kingman 4 Indiana  
Kingman Water Works Kingman 4 Indiana 1.1 
Knox Water Department Knox 4 Indiana 1.1 
Lawrenceburg Manchster & Spart Aurora 4 Indiana 1.1 
Lebanon Utilities Thorntown 4 Indiana 1.1 
Liberty Regional Waste District Selma 4 Indiana  
Lynnville Water Utility Lynnville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Marion City Water Department Marion 4 Indiana 1.1 
Marysville-Otisco-Nabb Water Marysville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Montpelier Water Works Montpelier 4 Indiana 1.1 
Newton Co Regional Water & Sewer Brook 4 Indiana 1.1 





Petersburg Waterworks Petersburg 4 Indiana 1.1 
Reelsville Water Co Greencastle 4 Indiana 1.1 
Rockville Water Department Rockville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Syracuse Water Department Syracuse 4 Indiana 1.1 
Tennyson Water Department Tennyson 4 Indiana 1.1 
Tipton Utilities Tipton 4 Indiana 1.1 
Tipton Utilities Tipton 4 Indiana 1.1 
Tri County Conservancy District Indianapolis 4 Indiana 1.1 
Tri-Township Water Corp Lawrenceburg 4 Indiana 1.1 
Veedersburg Water Department Veedersburg 4 Indiana 1.1 
Walkerton Water Maintenance Walkerton 4 Indiana 1.1 
Water Department Tell City 4 Indiana 1.1 
Water Works Berne 4 Indiana 1.1 
White Water Services LLC Connersville 4 Indiana 1.1 
Winslow Water Department Winslow 4 Indiana 1.1 
All Lawn Care Services Fort Wayne 5 Indiana 1.3 
Bicknell Water Utilities Bicknell 5 Indiana 1.3 
Crawford County Water Co Marengo 5 Indiana 1.3 
Department Of Water Works Greencastle 5 Indiana 1.3 
Ellis Water Co Inc Linton 5 Indiana 1.3 
Fairview Park Water Utility Clinton 5 Indiana 1.3 
Floyd Knobs Water Co Floyds Knobs 5 Indiana 1.3 
Hartford City Water Works Hartford City 5 Indiana 1.3 
Huntingburg Water Works Huntingburg 5 Indiana 1.3 
Indiana American Water Co Crawfordsville 5 Indiana 1.3 
Kendallville Water Department Kendallville 5 Indiana  
La Porte Water Billing Department La Porte 5 Indiana  
Mapleturn Utilities Martinsville 5 Indiana 1.3 
Mapleturn Utilities Inc Martinsville 5 Indiana 1.3 
Oolitic Town Water Works Oolitic 5 Indiana 1.3 
Petersburg Water Department Petersburg 5 Indiana 1.3 
Pioneer Water LLC Leo 5 Indiana 1.3 
Rensselaer Water Department Rensselaer 5 Indiana 1.3 
Rural Membership Water Corp Henryville 5 Indiana 1.3 
Springs Valley Water District West Baden Spgs 5 Indiana 1.3 
Town Of Paragon Water Utility Paragon 5 Indiana  
Valparaiso Lake Area Valparaiso 5 Indiana 1.3 
Water Works Plant Fairmount 5 Indiana 1.3 
Bluffton Water Department Bluffton 6 Indiana 1.6 
Carlisle Water Office Carlisle 6 Indiana 1.6 
Chandler Water Department Chandler 6 Indiana  
Daviess County Rural Water Inc Washington 6 Indiana 1.6 
East Monroe Water Corp Bloomington 6 Indiana 1.6 
Forte Water Systems Inc Elkhart 6 Indiana 1.6 
Grabill Water Department Grabill 6 Indiana 1.6 
Greensburg Utilities Office Greensburg 6 Indiana  
Hoosier Hills Regional Water Milan 6 Indiana 1.6 
Knox County Water Inc Vincennes 6 Indiana 1.6 





Osgood City Of Water Department Osgood 6 Indiana 1.6 
Paoli Water Department Paoli 6 Indiana 1.6 
Plymouth Water Department Plymouth 6 Indiana 1.6 
Rabb Water Systems Inc Warsaw 6 Indiana 1.6 
Rochester Water Works Rochester 6 Indiana 1.6 
Sellersburg Water Billing Office Sellersburg 6 Indiana 1.6 
South Central Regional Sewer Bloomington 6 Indiana 1.6 
Sunman Water Works Operations Sunman 6 Indiana 1.6 
Tipton Water Department Tipton 6 Indiana 1.6 
Butler City Water Department Butler 7 Indiana  
City Of Nappanee Waste Water Nappanee 7 Indiana 1.8 
Goshen Water & Sewer Goshen 7 Indiana  
Hartford City Water Department Hartford City 7 Indiana  
Hebron Water Department Hebron 7 Indiana 1.8 
Hymera Water Works Hymera 7 Indiana 1.8 
Maysville Regional Water-Sewer Harlan 7 Indiana 1.8 
Michigan City Water Department Michigan City 7 Indiana 1.8 
Mid States Irrigation Elkhart 7 Indiana 1.8 
Mitchell Water & Sewer Department Mitchell 7 Indiana  
Ni Source Goshen 7 Indiana 1.8 
Portland Water Offices Portland 7 Indiana 1.8 
South Lawrence Utilities Mitchell 7 Indiana 1.8 
Versailles Water Department Versailles 7 Indiana 1.8 
Waldron Conservancy District Waldron 7 Indiana 1.8 
Water Department Scottsburg 7 Indiana 1.8 
Watson Rural Water Co Inc Jeffersonville 7 Indiana 1.8 
Allen County Regional Water Fort Wayne 8 Indiana 2.1 
Butler Water Department Butler 8 Indiana 2.1 
Clay City Town Hall Clay City 8 Indiana  
Clay City Water Works Clay City 8 Indiana 2.1 
Decatur Water Department Decatur 8 Indiana 2.1 
Eastern Bartholomew Water Corp Taylorsville 8 Indiana 2.1 
Franklin County Water Association Brookville 8 Indiana 2.1 
Indiana American Water Co West Lafayette 8 Indiana 2.1 
Jasonville Water Department Jasonville 8 Indiana 2.1 
Linton Gas & Water Linton 8 Indiana  
Linton Water Works Lyons 8 Indiana 1.1 
Lyons Water Department Lyons 8 Indiana 2.1 
Monroeville Water Works Department Monroeville 8 Indiana 2.1 
New Castle Waterworks Clerk New Castle 8 Indiana  
North Lawrence Water Authority Bedford 8 Indiana 2.1 
Plymouth Water Department Plymouth 8 Indiana 2.1 
Scottsburg Water Department Scottsburg 8 Indiana 2.1 
South Harrison Water Corp Corydon 8 Indiana 2.1 
West Terre Haute Water Department West Terre Haute 8 Indiana 2.1 
Cicero Utilities Cicero 9 Indiana 2.4 
Hanover Water Department Hanover 9 Indiana 2.4 





Jennings Northwest Regional North Vernon 9 Indiana 1.5 
St Anthony Water Utilities St Anthony 9 Indiana 2.4 
Trafalgar Water Utilities Trafalgar 9 Indiana 2.4 
Apartment Water Services Crown Point 10 Indiana 2.6 
Borden-Tri County Water Borden 10 Indiana 2.6 
Brown County Water Utility Inc Morgantown 10 Indiana 2.6 
Crown Point Water Department 
Billing 
Crown Point 10 Indiana 2.6 
Indiana American Water Co Warsaw 10 Indiana 2.6 
Indiana American Water Co Boggstown 10 Indiana 2.6 
Indiana American Water Co Summitville 10 Indiana 2.6 
Jackson Co Water Utility Inc Brownstown 10 Indiana 2.6 
Kendallville Water Department Kendallville 10 Indiana 2.6 
Lowell Water Department Lowell 10 Indiana 2.6 
Matt Cleary LLC Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
Midwest Contract Operations Valparaiso 10 Indiana 2.6 
Patriot Water Co Patriot 10 Indiana 2.6 
Santa Claus Water Plant Santa Claus 10 Indiana 2.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 10 Indiana 2.6 
Edwardsville Water Corp Georgetown 11 Indiana 2.9 
Gaston Water Department Gaston 11 Indiana 2.9 
Nashville Water Department Nashville 11 Indiana 2.9 
North Vernon Utilities North Vernon 11 Indiana  
Seelyville Water & Sewage Wrks Terre Haute 11 Indiana 2.9 
Clay Township Regional Waste 
District 
Indianapolis 12 Indiana 3.2 
Fort Wayne Water Department Fort Wayne 12 Indiana 3.2 
Schererville Water & Sewer Schererville 12 Indiana  
Batesville Water Department Batesville 13 Indiana 3.4 
Upland Water Department Upland 13 Indiana 3.4 
Fall Creek Regional Waste District Pendleton 15 Indiana  
Greenfield Water Department Greenfield 15 Indiana 3.9 
Mt Vernon Water Works Department Mt Vernon 15 Indiana 3.9 
Aqua Indiana Inc Indianapolis 16 Indiana  
Stucker Fork Water Utility Austin 16 Indiana 4.2 
Water Works Frankfort 16 Indiana 4.2 
Ellettsville Water & Waste Ellettsville 17 Indiana 4.5 
Evansville Water Department Evansville 20 Indiana 5.3 
Gertzen Water Management Co Valparaiso 20 Indiana 5.3 
Indiana American Water Co Muncie 20 Indiana 5.3 
La Porte Water Department La Porte 20 Indiana 5.3 
South Bend Water Works Department South Bend 20 Indiana  





Stucker Fork Conservancy District Austin 22 Indiana 5.8 
West Central Conservancy Avon 22 Indiana 5.8 
Ingalls Water Office Ingalls 23 Indiana 6.0 
Vincennes Water Department Vincennes 23 Indiana 6.0 
Water Plant Anderson 23 Indiana 6.0 
Madison Sewage Department Madison 25 Indiana  
National Water Service LLC Paoli 25 Indiana 6.6 
Peru Water Management Peru 25 Indiana 6.6 
Indiana American Water Co Jeffersonville 28 Indiana 7.4 
Indiana American Water Co Terre Haute 28 Indiana 7.4 
Anderson Water Department Anderson 30 Indiana 7.9 
Aqua Indiana, Inc. Fort Wayne 30 Indiana  
Elwood Water & Sewage Office Elwood 30 Indiana  
Goshen Water & Sewer Plant Goshen 30 Indiana  
Indiana American Water Greenwood 30 Indiana  
Valparaiso Water Department Valparaiso 30 Indiana  
Cordry-Sweetwater Conservancy Nineveh 33 Indiana 8.7 
Anderson Water Department Anderson 34 Indiana 8.9 
Water Department Logansport 36 Indiana 9.5 
Bedford Water Department Bedford 40 Indiana 10.5 
Indiana American Water Co Richmond 40 Indiana 10.5 
Bargersville Utilities Bargersville 42 Indiana  
Patoka Regional Water District Dubois 44 Indiana 11.6 
Valparaiso Water Dept-Shop Valparaiso 62 Indiana 16.3 
Marion Utilities Office Marion 65 Indiana  
Columbus City Utilities Columbus 75 Indiana  
Elkhart Public Works & Utility Elkhart 100 Indiana  
Indiana American Water Co Gary 118 Indiana 31.0 
Global Water Technologies Inc Indianapolis 136 Indiana 85.6 
SUEZ Indianapolis 206 Indiana  
Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC Indianapolis 410 Indiana  
Citizens Energy Group - Citizens 
Thermal Division 
Indianapolis  Indiana  
Citizens Energy Group - Citizens 
Water Division 
Indianapolis  Indiana  
East Chicago Water Department East Chicago  Indiana 9.2 
Harbour Water Corporation Indianapolis  Indiana  
Suez Gary  Indiana 21.0 
United Water West Lafayette Inc West Lafayette  Indiana  
Zionsville Water Corporation Indianapolis  Indiana  
 
 
